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ABSTRACT
Corporate governance is a monitoring mechanism that is created because of 
the possible conflict of interest that results from the separation of ownership 
and control between the shareholders and the board of directors. Control 
and procedures of companies can be improved given the introduction of 
corporate governance. Previous literature supports that corporate governance 
is an effective corporate governance that helps companies to increase the 
value of the firm, attract foreign investors, and improve quality of reporting. 
Previous studies also indicate that investors are drawn to companies that are 
actively involved in sustainability activities. However, real commitments 
from Malaysian companies for sustainable developments are questionable. 
This study identifies corporate governance mechanisms from agency theory 
perspective, in assessing its relationship to the financial performance, and 
sustainability disclosures. The theoretical contribution of this study is by the 
extension of previous studies by exploring the relationship and examining 
the mediating effect in sustainability disclosures between corporate 
governance and financial performance. 
Keywords: corporate governance, sustainability disclosures, global 
reporting initiative (GRI), financial performance
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INTRODUCTION
Companies are usually formed with an ultimate objective of producing 
maximum returns for its shareholders. However, shareholders manage 
companies unnecessarily. The individuals who operate the company, such 
as managers, chief executive officers, and directors, may not necessarily 
hold shares in the company. As such, a separation of ownership and control 
occurs. Therefore, the power of setting company policies and making 
operational decision lies in the hands of the board of directors although 
shareholders represent the rightful owner of a company (Cheah & Lee, 
2009). The separation of ownership and control causes conflict of interest 
between the shareholders and board of directors. In principle, all operational 
decisions should be made in the best interests of the shareholders because 
they are the rightful owners of the company. However, this may not be the 
case. Some of the decisions made may be in the best interest of the board 
of directors instead. As such, this results in conflict of interest between the 
board of directors and the shareholders. Therefore, corporate governance 
is introduced to improve the monitoring mechanism for the benefit of the 
shareholders. 
Corporate governance was first introduced in Malaysia after the 
1997 Asian financial crisis with the establishment of High Level Finance 
Committee in 1998. The committee was established to address corporate 
governance issues and to increase investors’ confidence, which was then 
extremely low. In 1999, the High Level Finance Committee report was 
issued in providing a framework on corporate governance to companies. 
Revisions were then made to further strengthen the framework on corporate 
governance. In 2000, Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (Code) 
was issued and was then revised into the 2007 Code. In 2011, Corporate 
Governance Blueprint 2011 (Blueprint) was released. With the revisions, 
the focus of corporate governance shifted. For instance, revisions made in 
the 2007 Code have further strengthened the roles and responsibilities of 
the board of directors and audit committee. The Blueprint reminded board 
of directors and shareholders on the importance of ethical and sustainability 
issues. The most recent revision was made in 2012 where the Malaysian 
Code on Corporate Governance 2012 (MCCG 2012) was issued. In MCCG 
2012, the board of directors is once again reminded to act in the best 
interest for the company and shareholders. Furthermore, interest of other 
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stakeholders is not to be neglected. MCCG 2012 further stressed on the 
importance of directors being ethical and of making sustainable decisions 
in the pursuance of desired financial returns. 
PROBLEM STATEMENT
Shareholders today do not only expect good financial returns from companies, 
but also expect companies to perform its corporate social responsibility by 
involvement in sustainability activities. When such involvement occurs, 
disclosures of the involvement can be made in the annual reports of the 
company. The number of companies making sustainability disclosures in their 
annual reports has increased in past years. However, the real commitments 
from Malaysian companies are questionable. PricewaterhouseCoopers 
conducted a survey in 2014 as regards sustainability strategies of companies. 
Only 35% of the companies surveyed were found to have dedicated teams 
to drive and monitor the sustainability strategies of the companies, thereby 
indicating that that the management of the company lacks dedication in 
their sustainability involvements. 
In 2002, a professional body, namely, The Association of Chartered 
Certified Accountants (ACCA), launched an annual award in recognition of 
good sustainability reports by companies. The award was named “ACCA 
Malaysia Environmental and Social Reporting Awards” (MESRA). MESRA 
also aims to cultivate Malaysian companies in improving corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) disclosures of companies. In 2009, the award was 
renamed to “ACCA Malaysia Sustainability Reporting Awards” (MaSRA). 
The new name covers broader disclosures in the aspects of society, economy, 
and environment. Although the award had been carried out for the 8th cycle 
in 2009, MaSRA had only solicited 56 entrants, which represented only 
6.1% of the total listed companies in Bursa Malaysia (911 as of December 
31, 2013). In addition to efforts from ACCA, the local authority named 
Securities Commission Malaysia (SCM) has also attempted to emphasize 
the importance of corporate growth in a sustainable manner. In 2011, 
SCM issued Blueprint, which advises the Board of Directors to oversee 
sustainability strategies in taking care of stakeholders’ interest. However, 
the low participation rate in MaSRA in 2013 and 2014 is discouraging. 
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RESEARCH OBJECTIVE
This research aims to examine the relationship among corporate governance 
mechanisms, sustainability disclosures, and financial performance in 
Malaysian listed companies. 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
The theoretical contribution of this study is to extend previous research 
by exploring the relationship among corporate governance, sustainability 
disclosure, and financial performance. Much of previous research focuses 
on the relationship of corporate governance towards financial performance, 
and sustainability disclosure towards financial performance separately. This 
study will also contribute to the existing literature by providing empirical 
data. This study will then benefit the practitioners or the company leaders by 
providing them information on the usefulness of corporate governance and 
environmental disclosures towards the bottom-line of the companies (i.e., 
financial performance). Today, expectations of stakeholders on companies 
have shifted from pure financial gains to broader aspects, such as expecting 
companies to be involved in sustainability activities. Therefore, company 
leaders must aware of the effect of corporate governance and sustainability 
reporting towards the financial performance of the company. 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATION
Agency theory is chosen for this study because it is frequently used in 
previous literature (Mazlina & Ayoib, 2011; Mohd Hassan, Rashidah, 
Nadiah, & Sakthi, 2006; Mohd Hassan, Rashidah, & Sakthi, 2008; Rachagan 
& Satkunasingam, 2009; Shamsul, Nor Zalina, & Mohamad Naimi, 2010)
this study also investigates the association between direct and indirect 
managerial shareholdings with agency costs. Design/methodology/approach 
\u2013 The data for the study is obtained from two sources, namely primary 
(questionnaire in explaining the principal-agent relationship between the 
shareholders and the boards of directors. According to Htay, Syed Ahmed, 
and Ahamed Kameel (2013), concepts from agency theory are frequently 
used in United Kingdom and Malaysia. Agent refers to the person appointed 
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by the principal. In this study, agent refers to the board of directors, and the 
principal refers to the shareholders of the company. The board of directors 
(agent) owes fiduciary duty to the shareholders (principal). According to 
Blueprint, fiduciary duty means each individual director is acting in good 
faith, without self-interest, and applies reasonable degree of care and 
diligence to the shareholders. Therefore, the director is expected to act in 
the best interest of the company and its shareholders. 
Alchian and Demsetz were the first to introduce agency theory in 
1972 and further developed by Jensen and Meckling in 1976 (Htay, Salman 
& Meera, 2013). According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), separation of 
ownership and control causes conflict of interest. The appointed board of 
directors may make operational decisions for their own interest instead of 
the shareholders’ best interest. Both the principals and agents are assumed as 
utility maximizer. Therefore, the board of directors have no reason to act in 
shareholders’ best interest. As a result, agency costs occur, which comprises 
cost of monitoring, bonding, and residual loss (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Agency theory states that when conflict of interest is eliminated, the agency 
costs are reduced and hence, performances of companies are improved 
(Welbourne & Cyr, 1996).
Together with the agency theory, stakeholder theory will be used in 
explaining how companies responded to the increasing pressures from 
its stakeholders. Without the demands and pressures from stakeholders, 
companies may not report disclosures on sustainability involvements in 
their annual reports. Several previous studies have applied stakeholder 
theory in explaining the increased sustainability involvements of companies 
(Goh, Suhaiza, & Nabsiah, 2006; Low, 2015; Yusoff, Yusoff & Lehman, 
2007; Wong & Jamilah, 2010) Malaysia, were conducted and analysed 
through within-case and cross-case analysis. Three research questions 
focusing on aspects of CSR (internal and external. Freeman first introduced 
stakeholder theory in 1984 (Lansiluoto, Jarvenpaa & Krumwiede, 2013). 
Friedman & Miles (2006) defined stakeholders as an individual or a group 
of people who can be affected by the decisions of the company. Stakeholders 
comprise shareholders, customers, suppliers, managers, lenders, and 
general public. Yusoff, Yusoff & Lehman (2007) explained that companies 
have accountability in making disclosures to stakeholders because the 
stakeholders rely on the information disclosed to make business decisions. 
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According to Htay, Salman and Meera (2013), stakeholders are as important 
as shareholders. Stakeholders hold the power in influencing the directions 
and strategies of the companies. 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
According to Cheah & Lee (2009), a global standard definition for corporate 
governance is lacking. This study adopts the definition of corporate 
governance from MCCG 2012 guidelines. In Malaysia, listed companies 
are governed by MCCG 2012. Considering that this study is conducted in 
Malaysia, the use of its local authority definition is well-justified. 
MCCG 2012 defined corporate governance as “The process and 
structure used to direct and manage the business and affairs of the company 
towards enhancing business prosperity and corporate accountability with the 
ultimate objective of realising long-term shareholder value, whilst taking 
into account the interests of other stakeholders.”
Many corporate governance mechanisms are used. In this study, four 
corporate governance mechanisms are selected using agency theory as 
follows: (1) proportion of independent directors, (2) non-duality of chief 
executive officer (CEO) and (3) board size. 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Proportion of Independent Directors and Financial 
Performance
The board of directors (board) forms an internal control mechanism 
from the agency perspectives to address the conflict of interest between the 
principal and its agent (Ujunwa, 2012). As such, such control mechanisms are 
essential in measuring the relationship of Board characteristics and financial 
performance. According to MCCG 2012 (Principles 3, Recommendation 
3.5), having the majority of independent directors in the board is vital to 
the company, thereby ensuring a balance of power and authority among the 
board members. Germain, Galy & Lee (2014) defined executive directors 
as full time directors who are employed by the companies. Generally, 
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executive directors made daily operational decisions; therefore, executive 
directors are not considered independent directors. Independent directors 
also refer to non-executive directors who are not involved in making daily 
operational decisions. 
Bar-Yosef and Prencipe (2013) found that high board independence 
improve corporate governance quality. A good proportion of independent 
directors over the total directors in the board leads to improved corporate 
governance monitoring quality (Akhtaruddin & Hasnah, 2010). High 
board independence also deters self-interest actions (El-Chaarani, 2014). 
Based on agency theory, when corporate governance monitoring quality 
improves, the financial performance will improve. This claim is supported 
by many previous studies that found that proportion of independent 
directors and financial performance has a significant and positive 
relationship (Mashayekhi & Bazaz, 2008; Reddy, Locke, & Scrimgeour, 
2010). However, results from other previous studies are contradicted. For 
instance, Sheikh, Wang & Khan (2013), in a study in in Pakistan, found 
that the proportion of independent directors and financial performance has 
a significant and negative relationship. The arguments above lead to the 
following proposition:
H1a: A larger proportion of independent directors will improve the 
financial performance of Malaysian listed companies. 
Non-Duality of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Financial 
Performance
Non-duality of CEO refers to the positions of CEO and board 
chairperson held by two separate individuals. MCCG 2012 in Malaysia 
(Principles 3, Recommendation 3.4) recommends the practice of non-duality 
of CEO. In other words, a person who holds the position of CEO should 
not be the chairperson to the board. By separating these two positions, 
responsibility borders are clearer and thus enhances the accountability of 
the board (MCCG 2012). However, MCCG 2012 did not make mandatory 
separation of these two positions. Companies that do not follow the 
recommended practice will have to disclose its justification at their annual 
report. 
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Previous literature revealed conflicting results over the relationship 
between non-duality of CEO and financial performance. For instance, 
Andreou, Louca, & Panayides (2014) conducted a study and found that 
non-duality of CEO negatively related to financial performance. Therefore, 
non-duality of CEO worsens the financial performance of the company. This 
finding opposed the agency theory, which suggests the non-duality of CEO 
strengthens the monitoring and controlling mechanism of the board. This 
strengthening in turn improves the financial performance of companies. 
Andreou et al. (2014) argued that the findings can be due to the specific 
maritime industry studied, which can then be different from other industries 
in general. Ujunwa (2012) another study and found that separation of CEO 
and board chairperson has positive relationship with financial performance. 
This result is supported by the agency theory. However, Ujunwa (2012) 
emphasized that the non-duality of CEO may not be useful for new firms 
because separation of these two positions may not allow the flow of good 
information to  board members. As a result, valuable discussion between the 
CEO and board members may be deterred and hence, financial performance 
can be hindered. However, the hypothesis developed for this study follows 
the recommendation of MCCG 2012, which supports the non-duality of 
CEO as follows:
H2a: Non-duality of CEO will improve the financial performance of 
Malaysian listed companies.
Board Size and Financial Performance
Board size refers to the total number of directors in the board of 
directors (board) within a company. Board size is also one of the corporate 
governance mechanisms that are regularly examined by previous literature in 
relation to financial performance. According to Ebaid (2013), board size may 
influence the board’s monitoring effectiveness. Large and small board sizes 
have their own advantages. For instance, large board size provides a large 
pool of expertise, thereby enhancing resources availability (Ebaid, 2013). 
However, smaller board size has its advantages, such as less free riding 
among its board members and lower coordination costs (Raheja, 2003). 
Ujunwa (2012) stated that board size has a positive relationship with 
financial performance. However, Ujunwa (2012) asserted that when board 
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size increases, the effect on financial performance decreases. Another 
previous study found board size to be a significant variable in influencing 
the return on assets (Andreou, Louca & Panayides, 2014). However, the 
study focused on maritime firms. Contradicting results were also found 
where the board size and financial performance do not have any significant 
relationship (Guo & Kumara, 2012; Reddy, Locke & Scrimgeour, 2010). 
Non-directional hypothesis is proposed for this study because of the 
conflicting results from past studies:
H3a: Board size has a significant effect on the financial performance 
of Malaysian listed companies.
Corporate Governance and Sustainability Disclosures
MCCG 2012 (Principles 1, Recommendation 1.4) recommends 
the board of directors to ensure strategies of the companies are in place 
for promoting sustainability activities. Although one of the benefits of 
corporate governance is the improvement of the voluntary disclosures of 
companies, this study aims to examine the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and sustainability disclosures. Sustainability 
disclosures refer to disclosures made by companies in their annual reports 
as regards the strategies of the company, involvements, and implementation 
of sustainability activities. According to Montiel (2008) and Petrini & 
Pozzebon (2010), CSRs and corporate sustainability (CS) are similar. CSR 
and CS cover three dimensions of economic, social, and environmental 
responsibility.
Proportion of Independent Directors and Sustainability 
Disclosures
Darmadi and Sodikin (2013) affirmed that independent directors may 
promote or lessen voluntary disclosures of companies. Therefore if a larger 
proportion of independent directors promotes information disclosures, more 
information will be disclosed by companies voluntarily. However, if a larger 
proportion of independent directors plays substitutive roles, voluntary 
information disclosed will be reduced or minimized. 
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Existing empirical studies provide contradicting results. Darmadi and 
Sodikin (2013) conducted a study on family-controlled firms and found that 
independent directors are negatively associated with voluntary disclosure. 
The reason towards this finding is the nature of firms studied. Darmadi and 
Sodikin (2013) explained that independent directors may lack independence 
because the study was based on family-controlled firms. Decision-making 
can be dominated by management. Another study conducted by Chen & 
Jaggi (2000) in Hong Kong has found that a proportion of independent 
directors positively improves the financial disclosures. Therefore, a larger 
proportion of independent directors leads to disclosures that are more 
comprehensive and are on a voluntary basis. Patelli and Prencipe (2007) 
found another positive association between the proportion of independent 
directors and the level of voluntary disclosure. Given that MCCG 2012 
promotes a larger proportion of independent directors, as well as greater 
disclosures on sustainability issues, the following hypothesis is developed:
H4a: Larger proportion of independent directors will improve the 
sustainability disclosures made by Malaysian listed companies. 
Non-Duality of CEO and Sustainability Disclosures
Non-duality of CEO means the CEO is not acting as the chairperson 
in the company’s board of directors of companies. As a result, the board 
could face less influence from the CEO and thus provide better decision-
making. Giannarakis, Konteos and Sariannidis (2014) explained that duality 
of CEO (i.e., the position of CEO and the board chairperson is held by the 
same individual) will diminish the monitoring role of the board. The study 
conducted by Giannarakis, Konteos and Sariannidis (2014) was on 500 
leading companies in United States. Although the study found that CEO 
duality is an insignificant determinant for sustainability disclosure, the 
duality does influence the extent of social information level. By contrast, 
Bar-Yosef and Prencipe (2013) found that non-duality of CEO will improve 
board independence, which in turn, improves the quality and transparency 
of financial reports. Therefore, the study emphasized the importance of 
non-duality of CEO that will strengthen the corporate governance system. 
As a result, disclosures and reports will be more transparent. 
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Given that MCCG 2012 recommends the non-duality of CEO as the 
best practice for Malaysian listed companies, the hypothesis developed 
for this study is in the same direction as MCCG 2012. This leads to the 
following hypothesis:
H5a: Non-duality of CEO will improve the sustainability disclosures 
made by Malaysian listed companies.
Board Size and Sustainability Disclosures
This study also proposes to examine the relationship between board 
size and sustainability disclosures. The size of the board within the company 
refers to the total number of directors in the board of directors. Board size can 
be large or small. Sustainability disclosures represent one of the voluntary 
disclosures made by companies. Some previous literature suggested that 
board size has a significant association with sustainability disclosures One 
example is Ahmed Haji (2013). The study was carried out in Malaysia 
using legitimacy theory. The findings found that sustainability disclosures 
made by Malaysian companies were increased as an attempt in reducing 
legitimacy gap with the public. The study also affirmed that the relationship 
between board size and financial performance was further strengthened by 
the revisions in 2007 Code.
This proposed study attempts to extend previous literature by 
examining the relationship of the board size and financial performance using 
the stakeholder theory. However, Roshima, Yuserrie, and Hasnah (2009) 
revealed that board size has no significant relationship with sustainability 
disclosure. Although both studies were conducted under the Malaysian 
context, contradicting results were still revealed. Given that larger board 
size may result in more conflict and increases communication problems 
between the board members, the following hypothesis is developed:
H6a: A negative relationship occurs between the board size and level 
of sustainability disclosures by Malaysian listed companies.
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Sustainability Disclosures and Financial Performance
Companies’ sustainability policies and implementations should be 
disclosed in their annual reports and websites. As explained by MCCG 
2012, perceptions of the public, investors, and potential investors towards 
the company can be enhanced by companies’ sustainability involvement. As 
explained by Garrison, Noreen, Brewer, Cheng & Yuen (2015), companies’ 
social performance can affect their companies’ financial performance. For 
instance, companies with poor social performance may be alienated by 
customers; thus, companies’ revenues and profits will suffer. Although 
Garrison, Noreen, Brewer, Cheng and Yuen (2015) pointed that initial 
costs on sustainability activities will be incurred by companies, the savings 
gained would be greater. 
Previous literature, such as Iatridis (2013), supported the positive 
relationship of environmental disclosures and financial performance. 
With high quality environmental disclosures, a company is perceived to 
have strong corporate governance and hence the company will face fewer 
difficulties in raising funds for operation (Iatridis, 2013). Litt, Sharma and 
Sharma (2014) conducted a study in the United States and concluded that 
socially responsible companies engaged in pollution prevention and/or 
climate protection initiative will likely to report higher profits because of real 
economic gains. These companies are unlikely to manipulate their profits. 
However, contradicting results were found by other previous literature. For 
instance, Makni, Francoeur and Bellavance (2009) found that corporate 
social performance of companies does not have a significant relationship 
with financial performance. However, a hypothesis developed for this study 
follows the recommendation of local authorities that promotes performing 
sustainability activities within companies.
H7a: Sustainability disclosures will improve financial performance 
of Malaysian listed companies.
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Mediating Effect in Sustainability Disclosures between 
Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Financial 
Performance
Previous studies that examine the mediating effect in sustainability 
disclosures between corporate governance mechanisms and financial 
performance are limited. However, Che Haat, Abdul Rahman and 
Mahenthiran (2008) conducted a study in Malaysia and found that 
transparency disclosure is not a significant mediating variable between 
corporate governance and financial performance. The study selected other 
corporate governance mechanisms, such as ownership structure and audit 
quality. The theory used in the study are also agency theory and resource 
dependence study. This proposed study aims to expand the previous study 
by selecting other corporate governance mechanisms  focusing on board of 
directors because they are important corporate governance device (Ujunwa, 
2012). This study also aims to explain the relationship between these 
variables using agency and stakeholder theories. The following hypothesis 
is developed:
H8a: Significant mediating effect occurs in sustainability disclosures 
between corporate governance mechanisms and financial 
performance.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The above discussions lead to the following theoretical framework:
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CONCLUSION
This study sought to identify the corporate governance mechanism 
that can improve sustainability disclosures of corporations. This study 
will also examine the relationship between these corporate governance 
mechanism and financial performance of Malaysian listed companies. The 
effect of sustainability disclosure towards financial performance will also 
be examined. The findings of this study will provide corporate leaders, 
such as chief executive officers and board of directors, to ascertain the 
effect of corporate governance and the sustainability disclosures towards 
the companies’ financial performance. The findings will also aid the 
policymakers as it will highlight those significant corporate governance 
mechanisms. Lastly, this study aims to provide empirical evidence to 
literature after samples are collected among Malaysian listed companies. 
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